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Implications 
 
Summary: This paper presents and critically discusses the origins and causes
of the Greek fiscal crisis and its implications for the euro currency as well as
the SEE economies. In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis the 
enormous increase in sovereign debt has emerged as an important negative 
outcome, since public debt was dramatically increased in an effort by the US
and the European governments to reduce the accumulated growth of private
debt in the years preceding the recent financial turmoil. Although Greece is the 
country member of the eurozone that has been in the middle of this ongoing
debt crisis, since November 2009 when it was made clear that its budget deficit
and mainly its public debt were not sustainable, Greece’s fiscal crisis is not
directly linked to the 2007 US subprime mortgage loan market crisis. As a
result of this negative downturn the Greek government happily accepted a
rescue plan of 110 billion euros designed and financed by the European Union
and the IMF. A lengthy austerity programme and a fiscal consolidation plan 
have been put forward and are to be implemented in the next three years. 
Key words: Sovereign risk, Debt crisis, Bonds market, Expectations, Fiscal 
guarantees. 






The financial crisis that unfolded in mid-2008 led to a dramatic increase of public 
debt in many advanced economies. During the recent months, we have seen the 
transformation of the 2007 US subprime mortgage loan market crisis into a sovereign 
debt crisis in the eurozone.
1 This overwhelming increase in the public debt has been 
to some extent the outcome of the effort by the governments to reduce the private 
debt that was accumulated during the years preceding the recent financial turmoil 
(Paul De Grauwe 2010a). Based on the ECB Quarterly Euro Area accounts for the 
years 1999 – 2010, a number of observations can be made. First, there are periods 
during which private debt increased substantially in the eurozone whereas there are 
other periods that private debt has been reduced with a great speed. Second, during 
periods of economic booms, private debt has risen by an accelerating rate. Third, for 
the whole period the increase in private debt was substantially greater than the per-
centage increase of public debt. Fourth, during the 2005-2007 economic boom, there 
is an average annual increase in private debt of the eurozone countries of approxi-
                                                        
1 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009, 2010) provide an excellent analysis of the recent 
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mately 35% of GDP. In contrast during the years of economic recession 2008-2009, 
private debt slows down and public debt growth accelerates (De Grauwe 2010a).
2  
The overall picture from these accounts is that private debt increased more 
than public over the whole period. This is exactly what we have observed since the 
peak of the crisis in October 2008 with governments being forced to bail out prob-
lematic banks, taking over a major share of the debts of failing financial institutions. 
Furthermore, they followed expansionary fiscal and monetary policies along with an 
array of complementary stimulus programmes in order to increase aggregate demand 
and to make sure that their economies will not fall in deep recession. These large 
stimulus programmes and bail out schemes are expected to increase total public sec-
tor debt of the world developed economies over 100% of the GDP in 2011 (Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD 2010). The sovereign 
debt crisis has important implications for the eurozone raising questions about it’s 
viability and about the future of the euro as a common currency (Adrian Blundell-
Wingall and Patrick Slovic 2010; International Monetary Fund - IMF 2010). As of 
this writing the debt crisis in the eurozone is still unfolding since (i) Ireland is the 
second country (Greece was the first one) requesting financial support from the res-
cue mechanism set out by EU/IMF and (ii) spreads on the 10-year government bond 
yields of Portugal and Spain have been increased substantially during the last month, 
raising fears for a potential domino effect in the eurozone. Part of this increase in 
interest rate spreads can be attributed to speculation but the roots of the problem are 
laid on the public finances of these countries, which have dramatically deteriorated in 
the aftermath of the financial turmoil. More specifically, gross debt/GDP ratio in-
creased across all EMU economies over the period 2007-2010 but not in a symmetric 
way; it was increased by 62.3% in Ireland, by 38.2% in Greece and by 36.3% in 
Spain. These were the largest increases of the gross debt/GDP ratio in the eurozone. 
Therefore, it was made clear that the recent financial turmoil had important conse-
quences for fiscal policy in the economies of the eurozone since the governments of 
the EMU countries provided large amounts of money to the domestic banking system 
in order to stabilize it. In addition, they adopted countercyclical fiscal policy meas-
ures to smooth out the consequences of economic recession (Theoharry Grammatikos 
and Robert Vermeulen 2010). An important question at this stage is whether the 
overall debt level for eurozone countries is sustainable. It seems that this issue is not 
crucial one since the total government debt for the eurozone countries is 86% of 
GDP. However, as we have already explained, this is not the case if one considers the 
situation in individual countries in the periphery of EMU (see also De Grauwe 
2010a, 2010b). Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2010) argue that one needs to decom-
pose total debt into three components in order to evaluate the issue of debt sustain-
ability. These components are: the primary balance, which is fully controlled by the 
government; the interest and growth contributions, which are not directly controlled 
by the government since it largely depends of expenses made by the government in 
the past as well as on the current economic situation; and the stock-flow adjustments, 
which are not considered to be direct expenses but can be rather considered as in-
                                                        
2 Irving Fisher (1932) argued that there is a trade–off between private and public debt. When the gov-
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vestments that lead to the increase of government’s assets. The last component is of 
crucial importance when we take into consideration the bank bailouts put forward by 
several governments. However, this part of the public debt may be similar to a group 
of countries it is the fast increase in the primary deficit due to the high speed of con-
traction that can lead to a serious debt crisis because of its permanent nature. Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and Spain are the countries with the largest primary balance and 
interest and growth contributions. Furthermore, Stephen G. Cecchetti, M. S. Mohan-
ti, and Fabrizio Zampolli (2010) look into the prospects and implications of the fu-
ture evolution in public debt. They argue that the most worrying aspect of the future 
development on public debt is that most of the future budget deficits (and thus public 
debt) are structural rather than cyclical in nature.  
The current Greek tragedy appears to have at least three key players. First, be-
yond any doubt the main responsibility for the debt crisis in Greece rests with the 
Greek governments and the existence of a weak political system that led to a constant 
mismanagement of the domestic economy adding government debt at a rate, which 
was much higher than the rest of the eurozone at a time that the level of the public 
debt has already been more than 100% of GDP. Therefore, the solution to the Greek 
problem in the long run would be to redesign its economic and fiscal policies 
whereas in the short run the attempt to ease the problem of liquidity came in the form 
of the 110 billion euros three-year rescue package financed by EU and IMF. Second, 
the financial markets and in particular the credit rating agencies have been very my-
opic in predicting the 2007 US sub-prime mortgage loan crisis. This failure led them 
to an overreaction in their attempt to unveil potential sovereign debt crises. Greece 
and other periphery EMU countries were the natural targets since they had for a long 
period of time very large budget deficits. They then downgraded Greece, which 
eventually led her to withdraw from the international bond markets (Ireland was re-
cently forced to do the same). Finally, a fair part of blame for the current situation is 
linked with the delayed reaction of the European Central Bank as well as by the Eu-
rozone governments. Eurozone countries and in particular Germany failed to give a 
clear signal to the markets that they were willing to provide immediate political and 
financial support to whichever country was facing financial problems. One reason for 
this slow reaction is linked to the issue of whether a bail out of a country-member is 
allowed according to the EU treaties. A stronger reason is the lack of political union 
in Europe, which has not as yet, in the fear of moral hazard issues, allowed the for-
mation of a federal fiscal budget and a risk-sharing scheme within EU. In early 2010, 
the European Central Bank did not have a clear strategy to fight the imminent debt 
crisis. In other words, ECB did not provide a clear signal to the markets that it would 
keep accepting government bonds as collateral in liquidity provision even in the case 
that the credit ratings of the bonds have been downgraded below the A- threshold 
rating. It was only when it was made clear that the markets will keep speculating on 
the Greek bonds that the ECB announced that it will continue accepting the Greek 
government bonds well into 2011 (De Grauwe 2010b, 2010c).
3 
                                                        
3 Michael G. Arghyrou and Alexandros Kontonikas (2010) and Arghyrou and John D. Tsoukalas (2010) 
analysed the EMU sovereign debt crisis along with the particular case for Greece with an application of 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a review of 
the sources of fiscal imbalances and the debt crisis in Greece. In section 2 we discuss 
the Greek stability programme and the rescue package financed by the EU and IMF. 
Section 3 looks into the alternative scenarios for the Greek economy as the debt crisis 
deepens in the eurozone with section 4 providing our concluding remarks.           
           
1. What are the Main Causes of the Greek Fiscal Crisis? 
 
A number of factors have contributed to the fiscal crisis that Greece has been experi-
encing since October 2009. Some of these factors are endogenous; have to do with 
the structure of the Greek economy itself, the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances 
that the Greek economy faces and the credibility problem of macroeconomic policy. 
Other factors are exogenous and have to do with the implications of the recent finan-
cial turmoil and the timing of the response of Europe to the Greek fiscal crisis. We 
will briefly review first the internal causes of the deteriorating fiscal stance of the 
Greek economy and then we will discuss external factors that might have contributed 
to the Greek fiscal crisis. 
 
1.1 Endogenous Causes of the Greek Fiscal Crisis 
 
There is no doubt that running consistently widening public deficits in conjunction 
with declining external competitiveness played a decisive role on the deteriorating 
fiscal stance of the Greek economy. The EU statistics agency, Eurostat, has recently 
revised upward the Greek budget deficit for 2009 and this has risen to 15.4% of 
GDP. Increased public expenditure in recent years led to dramatic increase in bor-
rowing requirements and high levels of accumulated public debt. The level of Central 
Government Debt as of 31.12.2009 amounts to € 298.5 billion. Government debt 
under Public Debt Management Agency’s management represents 93% of total Cen-
tral Government Debt outstanding (Figure 1). The debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to 
increase in coming years because of the € 110 billion EU rescue package, most likely 
getting above 150% by 2020. 
Figure 2 reports the evolution of public debt from the early 1970s to the pre-
sent time in relation to the political regime and the different governments in office. 
We clearly observe that the debt/GDP ratio was constant until 1979 and at very low 
levels, about 25%. The inauguration of the socialist government led by the late An-
dreas Papandreou highlights the new era in the Greek fiscal stance as the structural 
break in the series indicates. The socialist government implemented an economic 
policy programme that was mainly based on inducing the income of the average 
Greek household through extensive borrowing from the markets. This borrowing was 
completely streamlined to higher consumption levels in an effort to raise the standard 
of living of households. This process was also fuelled by the incoming capital flows 
from the EU in the form of agricultural subsidies and from the financing of infra-
structure within the broader framework of the convergence and cohesion policies of 
                                                                                                                                          
In particular for the case of Greece they found that there is a steady deterioration of macroeconomic fun-
damentals since 2001 and that there is a double shift in markets’ expectations from a regime of credible 
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the EU. In a relevant study, Stelios Makrydakis, Elias Tzavalis, and Athanassios 
Balfoussias (1999) have shown by using data for the period 1958-1995 that the 
Greek government failed to satisfy its intertemporal budget constrain and thus public 
debt turned out to be unsustainable in the long-run. They argue that the source of the 
detected unsustainability was due to a deterministic fiscal policy regime change, 
which was estimated to occur around 1979.
4 They also claim that the problem of debt 
unsustainability is due to endogenous factors and therefore, action should be taken in 
order to avoid the prospect of eventual insolvency.
5        
The lack of the necessary fiscal consolidation during the past ten years, when 
Greece was experiencing high growth rates, in relation to the continuous false report-
ing of fiscal data (in mid-October 2009, the newly elected government announced the 
budget deficit for 2009 was estimated to be 12.7% of GDP while the previous gov-
ernment was arguing in September 2009 that deficit would not be higher than 6.5% 
of GDP) have undermined the Greece’s government credibility. On top of that, the 
decline in competitiveness since EMU entry (Dimitris Malliaropoulos 2010) led to a 
persistent deficit in the current account. Increased “twin deficits” together with the 
lack of structural reforms in home regarding labour market flexibility, social security 
and market competition, obliged Greece to issue new bonds at short maturity periods 
and at higher interest rates compared to the “anchor” of the EMU, that is Germany. 
The ability of the Greek government to roll-over its debt has been questioned due to 
the perceived by international capital markets high probability of sovereign default.  
An important factor contributing to this perception is the maturity profile of 
the Greek public debt (Figure 3). As it is evident from Figure 3, balloon payments for 
the Greek bonds issued in the past are concentrated in the period 2010-2019, which 
affects the probability of sovereign default in these years. As a result, investors are 
requiring higher and higher interest rates in order to lend new money to Greece and 
this is mirrored in widening and volatile Greek spreads to German Bund. Figure 4 
shows how the Greek spreads fluctuated from early November 2009 -just after the 
newly elected Socialist government came to power- until Sunday 11 April when Eu-
rozone members agreed to provide, if needed, financial assistance to Greece. More 
specifically, in the spring-summer of 2008, the spread of the 10-year Greek govern-
ment bond yield against the German bund ranged from 25-65 basis points. Then fol-
lowing the credit crunch, the Greek spread reached 285 basis points in March 2009. 
There was then a decline the Greek spread reaching 121 basis points in August 2009. 
Following the general elections in October 2009 a dramatic increase of the spread 
was recorded when it was obvious that public debt was not sustainable. “When the 
news broke out, the new government in Greece was slow in its response, trying to 
reconcile electoral promises with hard reality as well as opposing tendencies within 
the party” (Tsoukalis 2010, p. 1). It kept rising and it reached 586 basis points in 
                                                        
4 It is safe to assume that a similar study with extended sample until 2010 and using the same economet-
ric methodology would still support this outcome.  
5 Contrary to the results of the Makridakis, Tzavalis, and Balfoussias (1999), Athanasios P. Papadopoulos 
and Moise Sidiropoulos (1999) were unable to reject the null hypothesis of public debt long-run sustai-
nability for the Greek economy and they also failed to provide evidence of a structural break in the series 
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April 2010. As of this writing, it stands a bit higher than 900 basis points following 
the fears for a domino effect in the eurozone and the worries regarding the Greek 
government’s ability and willingness to fully implement the austerity programme.  
Figure 5 illustrates the history of Greece’s ratings. It shows the most recent 
credit rating of the Greek bonds assigned by the main ratings agencies (Moody’s, 
S&P, Fitch and R&I). These ratings vary from BB+ to BBB-. Greece has been re-
cently downgraded to BBB- because of the high budget deficit and the perceived by 
the markets, unsustainable level of public debt.  
 
1.2 Exogenous Causes of the Greek Fiscal Crisis  
 
The Eurozone governments failed to give a clear signal indicating their readiness to 
support Greece, while the Greek fiscal crisis was escalating. Legal scepticism and 
questions like “are bailouts illegal?” were raised, mostly by Germany, for an issue 
which was partly political. However, there is nothing in the Maastricht Treaty that 
prevents a Member State or all EU Member States from helping a country in finan-
cial difficulty, individually or with the support of an outside body (IMF, EBRD, EIB, 
World Bank etc.). More specifically, Article 100, section 2 of the Maastricht Treaty 
states that “where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, may grant, under certain conditions, Community financial assistance to the 
Member State concerned”. Because of these disagreements among EU countries, 
markets assumed that the implicit guarantee on Greek debt by other EU countries has 
been withdrawn. While Eurozone policy makers were debating whether bailouts are 
illegal, at the same time there were some ambiguities about ECB’s collateral eligibil-
ity criteria that is the ECB’s policy to accept or refuse the downgraded (see Figure 5) 
Greek government bonds as collateral in liquidity provision presented. These ambi-
guities created problems for financial institutions holding Greek government bonds. 
Another exogenous factor that contributed to the instability of the Greek econ-
omy was the lack of solidarity funds at an EU level. EU is a monetary union not an 
economic one with a Federal Budget. EU has a common monetary policy set at a 
supranational level but economic policy (budgetary policies, wage policies, social 
policies, credit regulations etc.) is still in the hands of national policy makers. When-
ever a crisis occurs at the EU periphery, there is no adjustment mechanism in place to 
deal with such a crisis at a supranational level. The lack of European solidarity was 
inevitably mirrored in widening Greek spreads to German Bund. Eventually, the EU 
leaders agreed on 25 March 2010 an €110 billion (consisting of €80 billion provided 
by the EMU and €30 billion from the IMF) 3-year rescue package for Greece and on 
11 February 2010, President Jean-Claude Trichet announced that ECB will continue 
to accept Greek government debt as collateral, independently of the ratings assigned 
by the rating agencies. 
Lastly, Greece and Greece’s major trading partners in the Balkan peninsula 
were also hit by the 2007 global crisis - originating from the US sub-prime loan mar-
ket crisis - but with a time lag (Prodromos Vlamis and Evaggelos Karousos 2010). 
Nevertheless, recession may have hit Greece somewhat less badly than other coun-397  The Greek Crisis: Causes and Implications 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 4, pp. 391-404
tries because a relatively small manufacturing sector and of the large share of the 
shadow economy which is estimated to be 25%-30% of GDP. 
 
2. An Overview of the Fiscal Consolidation Programmes of 
Greece  
 
2.1 Greece’s Government Response to the Crisis 
 
Facing with escalating cost of borrowing in the late 2009 and the beginning of 2010 
the Greek government designed and adopted a fiscal consolidation programme in 
order to reduce the public debt and provide the framework to improve stability and 
growth to the economy. The Greek Stability and Growth Programme submitted to the 
European Commission on January 15, 2010. Its main elements on the revenues side 
were focused on (i) measures to reduce tax evasion and improve tax collection (esti-
mated to be worth €1.2bn, 0.5% of GDP); (ii) reduction of social contribution eva-
sion (to raise €1.2bn, 0.5% of GDP); (iii) a special levy on profitable companies 
(raised €0.87bn, 0.4% of GDP); (iv) acceleration of EU receipts for the public in-
vestment programme (to raise €1.4bn, 0.6% of GDP) and (v) increase on several 
types of indirect taxes. Regarding the government expenditures the following meas-
ures were taken, (i) a 10% cut in general government expenditure on salary allow-
ances (expected to save €0.65bn, 0.3% of GDP); (ii) a recruitment freeze in the pub-
lic sector for 2010 (to save €0.15bn, 0.1% of GDP); (iii) implementation of a 5:1 re-
tirement/recruitment ratio for public sector employees from 2011 onwards. Termina-
tion of many short-term contracts in the public sector, to cut operating expenditures 
for ministries 10% (estimated to save €0.12bn, and to result in a cut of 7k-8k teachers 
on short-term contracts); (iv) reduction in the budget item linked to social security 
and pension funds by 10% (to save €0.54bn, 0.2% of GDP) and (v) other relevant 
measures to drastically reduce government expenditures in most public services (see 
also Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2010). 
 
2.2 The EU-IMF Fiscal Consolidation Package 
 
The measures taken by the Greek government were proved to be short-lived since 
they were not enough to restore markets’ confidence. The Greek government was 
soon forced to enter in negotiations with the EU commission and the other EMU 
member-countries in order to agree on a rescue plan given its difficulties to borrow 
from financial markets. On 25 March 2010, an agreement was reached for a rescue 
plan, which involved a mechanism that relied on bilateral loans to Greece from other 
EU countries and loans from IMF at interest rates, which were lower than the market 
ones. The main features of this rescue plan on the revenue side are: (i) Value-added 
tax bands to be raised (by 4.5-5.0% for the lowest, 9-10% for the medium band and 
19-21% for the standard band). Higher VAT rates are estimated to result in €1.3bn of 
new revenues (0.55% of GDP); (ii) a substantial increase in indirect taxes of gaso-
line, tobacco and alcohol along with higher electricity charge and (iii) an increase of 
property taxes, taxes on luxury goods an on offshore companies and real estate. With 
respect to the required cuts on government expenses the mail elements are: (i) further 398  Georgios P. Kouretas and Prodromos Vlamis 
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reductions on total salary payments to employees of the public sector; (ii) a freeze on 
state pensions and (iii) Public sector works to be cut 5% (to save €0.5bn) and educa-
tion spending to be cut €0.2bn. 
6 
This initial rescue plan was revised on 2 May 2010 with the implementation of 
further austerity measures in an effort to achieve the targets set by the EU commis-
sion and the IMF. The main features of the revised plan regarding the effort to in-
crease tax revenues are: (i) a further rise of 2% in the main VAT rate to 23% (from 
21%). The two lower VAT rates will also be raised (by 1% for the current 10% rate 
and by 0.5% for the current 5% rate). The government expects the new VAT in-
creases to generate additional revues of €0.80bn (or 0.3% of GDP) in 2010 and 
€1.00bn (or 0.4% of GDP) in 2011. This was coupled by measures to broaden the 
VAT tax base; (ii) a further increase in the indirect taxes on fuels, tobacco products 
and alcoholic beverages, expected to bring in additional revenues of €0.45bn (or 
0.2% of GDP) in 2010 and €0.60bn (or 0.3% of GDP) in 2011 and (iii) imposition of 
further taxes on luxury goods, on firms’ profits (a one-off tax) and (iv) introduction 
of a “green tax”. The measures to further reduce the expenses have been again very 
drastic. Thus (i) The 13th and 14th annual salary instalments will be abolished for 
civil servants earning a gross salary in excess of €3,000/month; (ii) The Public In-
vestment Budget (PIB) for 2010 will be reduced by €0.5bn (or 0.2% of GDP); (iii) a 
3-year freeze in wages and pensions and (iv) further cut backs in central government 
operational costs. 
The implementation of this strict austerity programme will hopefully stabilize 
the economy. However, it is expected to cause a substantial decrease in demand for 
goods and services pushing the Greek economy to a deep recession. In this case, it 
will become more difficult for Greece to meet the requirements of the rescue plan. 
Therefore, it is absolutely imperative for the Greek fiscal and monetary authorities to 
design and implement economic policies that will boost economic growth and reduce 
unemployment (at the moment unemployment is rising at an accelerating rate).   
 
3. Implications of the Greek Fiscal Crisis and Future Challenges 
for Greece and Eurozone 
 
Let us say at the outset that it is not in the interest of any country to let one member 
of the EMU to run away from its debt obligations, as the associated political and 
economic costs would be substantial for everyone. There will be a general confi-
dence loss in ability of EU to deal with its fiscal and wider economic challenges. On 
the one hand, if Greece is let/forced to default, contagion to other Eurozone bond 
markets and Eurozone financial institutions, that hold significant part of the Greek 
bonds, is a strong possibility. Debt crisis in one member country of the Eurozone 
might trigger a more general crisis involving other Eurozone countries perceived to 
be “fragile” and have similar budgetary problems (like Spain, Ireland, Portugal). 
Spillover from Greece into Balkans might be possible too via trade and, more impor-
tantly, via financial links. Financial links via Greek banks are widespread, since 
                                                        
6 See also Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) and Ioannis Kokkoris, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, and Kiria-
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Greek banks have a considerable market share in Balkans and the south-eastern 
European economies and they are among the more aggressive lenders in these coun-
tries. Moreover, if Greece is let/forced to default, Greek commercial banks which 
hold government debt (about € 45bn) will be in trouble too.  
On the other hand, if Greece voluntarily leaves EMU, quits Euro and estab-
lishes a national currency, there will be certain economic costs to meet. Firstly, it will 
face larger debt payments due to devaluation of the national currency. Secondly, in-
ternational capital markets for new borrowing will be closed for Greece for a number 
of years (Barry Eichengreen 2007). Thirdly, Greece will be violently forced to bal-
ance its budget since it will be locked out international markets and it would not be 
possible to borrow money to finance budget and trade deficits. 
One last point; when discussing possible scenarios about the Greek fiscal cri-
sis one should not forget that the euro project seems to be mostly a political construc-
tion and not an economic one. “Economic and monetary union was the offspring of 
the Franco-German couple, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl to be precise. 
It was about high politics and peace on the continent, much less so about economics” 
(Loukas Tsoukalis 2010). By all means, credibility of the euro is currently at stake 
but too much political capital has been invested in it throughout the years to let it die. 
At the moment there is no consensus among the EU member states to move towards 
political union but, it is absolutely imperative to design and implement an institu-
tional budgetary framework (such as the European Financial Stability Facility) for 
supporting financially countries that face fiscal difficulties There is a need for a 
“close and increasingly binding coordination of national economic policies, combin-
ing incentives and sanctions, coupled with effective surveillance and conditional as-
sistance” (Tsoukalis 2010). However, at this moment it is clear that there is no con-
sensus within Eurozone member states to move forward into a more coherent politi-
cal union that would allow the transferring of budgetary and tax responsibilities to 
supranational authorities (De Grauwe 2010d, 2010e).  
Given that at the moment the monetary union is not coupled with a political 
union, two less ambitious -but very important plans for the medium term- have been 
proposed in the relevant literature. First, Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi (2008) and 
Gros and Thomas Mayer (2010) have recently proposed the creation of a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF). This new institution will receive its funds from those coun-
tries that run excessive budget deficits and debt levels. If a similar a crisis arises in 
the future, the EMF will be in position to support those countries that need financial 
assistance and in addition it will have the authority to impose certain rules when allo-
cating supporting funds. Second, De Grauwe and Wim Moesen (2009) proposed the 
creation of a common Eurobond, which might reduce pressures to Eurozone econo-
mies with excessive budget deficits. They argue that the interest rate for the Euro-
bond should be the weighted average of the national interest rates in order to avoid 
moral hazard problems. Furthermore, it is expected that the creation of a common 
Eurobond market (that will be sufficiently large) will attract foreign investors and 
provide with additional liquidity the bond markets in the eurozone economies.  
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4. Summary and Concluding Remarks  
 
The sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone is expected to have far reaching implica-
tions for the mechanisms of the eurozone as well as for the European Union. The 
current debt crisis have shown that a reform of current EU mechanisms must be put 
in force, otherwise the stability of the eurozone will be jeopardised and the euro cur-
rency itself will be negatively affected.   
We hope that it was made clear from our analysis that apart from the endoge-
nous structural problems of countries like Greece and other EMU periphery econo-
mies, a fair amount of the current problems could be attributed to the functioning of 
eurozone itself. In order for similar crisis to be avoided in the future, a set of mecha-
nisms should be designed and implemented at a supranational level. First, a mecha-
nism that will promote convergence in the competitive position of the individual 
members of the EU and will prevent the creation of trade imbalances is necessary. 
Second, economic policy (budgetary policies, wage policies, social policies, credit 
regulations etc.) is still in the hands of national policy makers. Whenever a crisis oc-
curs at the EU periphery, there is a need for an adjustment mechanism in place to 
deal with crisis at a supranational level. If such mechanisms are created that would 
literally transform the European Monetary Union into a political union with a com-
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Source: General Accounting Office, Ministry of Finance. Includes military debt,  
European Investment Bank, Bank of Greece, Council of Europe loans and securitized debt  
(accessed September 30, 2009). 
 
 







Source: Authors’ construction. The public debt data was taken from the Bank of Greece (2010). 
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Source: Public Debt Management Agency (2010). 
 
 





Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro (2010). 
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Greek 10-yr Spread to Bund (bp)
Sunday 11 Apr
Eurozone members agreed to provide 
financial assistance to Greece if needed
Thurs 11 Feb
European Council agrees to help
Greece if needed
Thurs 25 Mar (evening)
Eurozone member states are ready to
contribute to coordinated bilateral loans as 
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